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American Civil WarSoldiers
20th North Carolina Infantry Regiment
CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA
May 1-4, 1863
Army of the Potomac
Gen. Hooker superseded Gen. Burnside in command of
the Army of the Potomac on Jan. 26, 1863. As nothing in the
way of active operations could be undertaken in the dead of
winter, more than two months were spent in getting the army in
good condition. During that time it remained in its winter
quarters on the left bank of the Rappahannock river opposite
Fredericksburg. It consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th,
11th and 12th army corps, respectively commanded by Maj.-Gens.
John F. Reynolds, Darius N. Couch, Daniel E. Sickles, George
G. Meade, John Sedgwick, Oliver O. Howard and Henry W. Slocum,
and the cavalry corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. George
Stoneman. In round numbers Hooker had 111,000 infantry,
11,000 cavalry, and 8,000 artillery, with 404 guns. Opposed
to this force was Lee's army, the Army of Northern Virginia,
made up of the 1st and 2nd army corps. The former was
commanded by Gen. James Longstreet and the latter by Gen.
Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson. Longstreet, with two divisions
and two battalions of artillery, was absent in southeastern
Virginia, so the troops with Lee numbered about 57,000
infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and probably 170 pieces of artillery.
This force lay at Fredericksburg, on the south side of the
Rappahannock, where all winter Lee had been watching the
movements of the Federals.
Early in April Hooker advised his officers of his plan of
campaign. Stoneman, with the main body of the cavalry, was to
move up the Rappahannock, cross at the upper fords and cut
Lee's communication with his base of supplies at Richmond.
After crossing the river the cavalry was to divide into two
columns; one, under Gen. Averell, was to attack Gordonsville
and Culpeper, and the other, commanded by Gen. Buford, was to
reach the Fredericksburg railroad via Louisa Court House. The
two divisions were then to unite south of the Pamunkey river
to harass Lee's retreat from Fredericksburg which all felt was
sure to come. Stoneman started on his mission on April 13, but
heavy rains had made the river unfordable and he was compelled
to wait until the 28th before he could effect a crossing.
This delay interfered somewhat with the original plans, but on
the evening of the 26th Hooker issued orders for the corps of
Meade. Howard and Slocum to move the next morning in light
marching order for Kelly's ford, 27 miles above Fredericksburg
where they were to cross, then press rapidly forward, cross
the Rapidan, sweep down the southern bank and strike the
Confederate army on the left flank. Couch, with two of his
divisions, was to proceed to the United States ford and be in
readiness to cross as soon as the Confederate force there
should be driven away by the Federal advance. Gibbon's
division of this corps was left in camp at Falmouth, where it
was in plain view of the Confederates, and to move it might
give Lee some idea of Hooker's intentions. To further confuse
the enemy demonstrations had been made for several days at
various points along the river. To prevent Lee from sending a
strong force against the four corps operating above
Fredericksburg Sedgwick with his own corps and those of
Reynolds and Sickles, was to cross below the town and make a
demonstration to draw the attention of the enemy in that
direction.
On Monday morning, April 27, the troops moved according
to instructions, and reached Kelly's ford late in the
afternoon next day. A detachment was sent across in boats to
drive away the picket guard, and by daylight the next morning
all were over and on the way to the Rapidan. Stoneman crossed
his cavalry at the same time. Pleasonton's brigade of
cavalry, with two batteries, was attached to Slocum's corps
and this was all of that arm that participated in the battles
of Chancellorsville, the rest of Stoneman's command moving
toward Culpeper. Meade crossed the Rapidan at Ely's ford and
the other two corps at Germanna ford, 10 miles above. As soon
as Meade's column appeared on the south side of the
Rappahannock opposite the United States ford Couch threw the
pontoons across and passed his two divisions over. On the
afternoon of the 30th the four corps were concentrated at
Chancellorsville. Sedgwick waited until the 28th, to give the
other division of the army time to reach Kelly's ford, and
then moved down the river with the 1st, 3rd and 6th corps to a
point near the old Franklin crossing, where they bivouacked
for the night. Early the next morning the 1st and 6th corps
were crossed over, leaving Sickles' corps on the north side as
a reserve and to cover the advance with his artillery. A
small force of the enemy in rifle pits disputed the passage of
the river, but a detachment sent over in boats soon drove them
from their position. The Confederates then contented
themselves with shelling the advancing troops from the
batteries on the heights. When it became evident that no
serious attack was to be made on Sedgwick, Sickles' corps was
ordered to join the forces at Chancellorsville and moved on
the 30th. Sedgwick then disposed his forces in such a way as
to lead Lee to think a large body of troops was below the
town, and that an attack was likely to come from that quarter.
Had the feint succeeded the story of Chancellorsville might
have been differently told. In his report Lee says: "No
demonstration was made opposite any other part of our lines at
Fredericksburg, and the strength of the force that had crossed
and its apparent indisposition to attack indicated that the
principal effort of the enemy would be made in some other
quarter. This impression was confirmed by intelligence
received from Gen. Stuart that a large body of infantry and
artillery was passing up the river. During the forenoon of
the 29th, that officer reported that the enemy had crossed in
force near Kelly's ford on the preceding evening. Later in
the day he announced that a heavy column was moving from
Kelly's toward Germanna ford, on the Rapidan, and another
toward Ely's ford on that river. The routes they were
pursuing after crossing the Rapidan converge near
Chancellorsville, whence several roads lead to the rear of our
position at Fredericksburg."
This was the first intimation Lee had of Hooker's real
purpose. Upon receipt of this information he sent a despatch
to Gen. Anderson, as follows: "I have received reliable
intelligence that the enemy have crossed the river in force.
Why have you not kept me informed? I wish to see you at my
headquarters at once." The bearer of that despatch was
captured by some of the Union cavalry. The cavalry had also
captured a picket, among whom was an engineer officer
belonging to Stuart's staff, and who had in his possession a
diary containing the record of a council, held by the
Confederate generals some weeks before, in which it was
decided that the next battle was likely to be fought in the
vicinity of Chancellorsville, and that it would be well to
seize and prepare a position there. This diary and Lee's
despatch were turned over to Hooker by Pleasonton, who
suggested that, as Lee was now advised of the movements of the
Union forces and was expecting a fight at Chancellorsville, it
might be good tactics to forestall him by moving on toward
Fredericksburg and selecting a new position. Here was
Hooker's golden opportunity, but he allowed it to pass. Lee
remained in Fredericksburg until the 30th, still uncertain as
to Sedgwick's motives, and fearing to move in either direction
until he had a better understanding of the situation. Hooker
on the 29th had over 45,000 men, and Sickles had orders to
join him the next day with his corps, numbering 18,000 more.
Failing to receive Lee's despatch ordering him to
headquarters, Anderson retired to Tabernacle Church and
commenced intrenching. This was the only force to prevent
Hooker from pressing forward, seizing Banks' ford, thus
shortening the distance between himself and Sedgwick by at
least 10 miles, and forcing Lee to meet him at a disadvantage
on ground where the superior numbers of the Federals meant
certain victory.
Late on the 30th Lee became fully convinced that Sedgwick
did not intend to attack. Leaving Early's division and
Barksdale's brigade to hold Fredericksburg, the remainder of
the Confederate forces were concentrated in front of Hooker.
A little after sunrise on May 1 McLaws' division joined
Anderson, and three divisions of Jackson's corps arrived on
the field about 8 o'clock. Three hours later Hooker began his
advance in four columns, each preceded by a detachment of
cavalry. Howard and Slocum moved on the plank road to the
right, Sykes' division of Meade's corps and Hancock's division
of Couch's took the turnpike; the other two divisions of
Meade's corps (Humphreys' and Griffin's) took the river road
toward Banks' ford; French's division was to march south to
Todd's tavern, while Sickles' corps was held at
Chancellorsville and Dowdall's tavern, as a reserve and to
guard the ford against Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry. Hooker's
object was to form a line of battle with his left resting on
Banks' ford and his right on Tabernacle Church, which was to
be his headquarters. But the ground, which might have been
occupied the day before almost without a struggle, was now in
possession of the enemy. When Jackson reached Tabernacle
Church, he stopped the work of intrenching and moved forward
to meet Hooker. Sykes, therefore, had not proceeded more than
a mile before he encountered McLaws' division deployed on both
sides of the pike. McLaws fell back steadily for a mile, when
he was reinforced by Anderson and Ramseur, and the
Confederates now assumed the offensive. Sykes tried to
connect his line with Slocum by throwing out a regiment as
skirmishers, but the movement failed. Anderson succeeded in
getting on his flank, and he was compelled to fall back behind
Hancock, whose command then came to the front and engaged the
enemy. Sykes then secured a strong position, which he was
preparing to hold, when the orders came for all to fall back
to the positions they held early in the morning. Couch and
Hancock protested against anything like a retreat. The
general position was a good one. The infantry was almost
clear of the woods and thickets, and there was plenty of open
space in which the artillery could be used effectively. Gen.
Warren, chief engineer on Hooker's staff, urged Couch and
Hancock to hold their positions until he could consult Hooker,
but the latter would not rescind the order to retire.
Subsequently he countermanded the order and directed the
troops to return to their positions, but it was too late, as
the enemy was already in possession of the ridge.
Meantime Meade's column had come within sight of Banks'
ford without seeing anything of the enemy when the order was
received to fall back to Chancellorsville. Both divisions
started to return, but Griffin was ordered to form on
Hancock's left, where about 6 p. m. he aided in repulsing the
enemy in an advance on Sykes' position, after which they went
into bivouac for the night. Humphreys was sent to the extreme
left of the line to guard the approaches to the United States
ford. French, who had moved in the morning via Todd's tavern,
came within sight of the Confederates, but was ordered to fall
back before he could engage them. During the afternoon a new
line was formed with Meade on the left toward Fredericksburg
facing east, Slocum in the center facing south, Howard on the
right facing west, with Couch and Sickles in reserve, except
one brigade from each division, which occupied positions in
the front line. The left and center were protected in front
by ravines, through which ran small brooks, but on the right
there was nothing but the thickets to hinder a near approach
of the enemy in an attack on Howard. As thus formed the line
covered all the roads passing through Chancellorsville. Late
in the day an assault was made by Wright and Stuart on the
advance portion of Slocum's corps and it was driven back on
the main body. Artillery was then brought up and a heavy fire
directed against Slocum, but he held his position. An
artillery fire was also opened on Hancock's line, when Knap's
battery replied with such effectiveness that the Confederates
gave up the attempt to drive the Union troops back by this
method. Owing to the thickets, which screened the Federal
army, Lee was at a loss where to direct his attacks, and the
waning hours of the day were spent in a number of pretended
assaults at various points to ascertain if possible, just how
Hooker's forces were posted. These demonstrations developed
the fact that the lines in front of Chancellorsville were
impregnable. Lee and Jackson held a consultation about dark
to determine the course they should pursue on the following
day. Stuart had learned the weakness of the Union right and
had communicated his knowledge to Jackson, who now advised a
flank movement against that part of the line.
During the night the roads were picketed by the Federal
cavalry while within the lines of both armies could be heard
the sound of the ax as the contending forces engaged in
strengthening their fronts by log breastworks, etc. In some
places along the Union line this work was continued far into
the next day. Long before daylight on the morning of the 3rd
Jackson was up and studying a rough map of the country to find
a route to the right and rear of the Union army. An old
resident was found, who pointed out a way, and at sunrise
Jackson with his three divisions, was on the march. For some
distance the movement was hidden by the dense forest, and then
a point was reached where the by-road ran over a hill in plain
view of Sickles' position. It was readily seen that it was a
movement in force, but as the road here ran due south and
directly away from the Federals, it was thought the
Confederate retreat was begun. Gen. Birney reported the
matter to Sickles and at the same time directed a section of
Clark's rifled battery to fire a few shots at the moving
column. The range was easily found and Birney ordered the
rest of the battery to the same position. The artillery fire
was so effective that the column was apparently thrown into
confusion, hurrying forward to get out of range of the guns.
This fact added to the belief that the enemy was in full
retreat. This was about 8 a. m. Hooker was at once notified
of the affair and was inclined to believe that the
Confederates were retiring. Realizing, however, that it might
be one of the flank movements for which Jackson was noted, he
issued orders to Slocum and Howard to strengthen their lines
as much as possible and advance their pickets "to obtain
timely information of their approach."
At noon Sickles received orders to follow Jackson and
harass his movements. Birney's division, with two battalions
of Berdan's sharpshooters and Randolph's battery, were hurried
forward, supported by Whipple's division. Birney's advance was
checked by a 12-pounder battery at the iron foundry near
Welford's house, but Livingston's battery was brought up and
soon silenced the enemy's guns. Pleasonton's cavalry was also
brought up as a reinforcement, but the woods being too thick
to permit its use to advantage, Sickles advised Pleasonton to
return to the open space near Scott's run. Sickles wanted to
cut off the divisions of Anderson and McLaws and capture them,
and sent for reinforcements for that purpose. He was promised
the rest of his own corps, as well as support from Slocum and
Howard, and was preparing to attack, when Hooker changed his
mind and recalled the reinforcements. About 300 prisoners
were taken, however, and from these it was learned that
Jackson's purpose was to strike a blow on the right. But the
information came too late to be of service.
All day Lee had been keeping up a demonstration against
the Union left and center; now directing a heavy cannonade
against Meade; now a musketry fire against Couch and Slocum;
followed by an attack on Hancock, who occupied a position in
advance of the main line. These movements were intended to
create the impression that the principal assault was to be
made in that quarter, and to draw attention from Jackson. By
3 p. m. Jackson had reached the plank road, within 2 miles of
Howard's corps. Howard had neglected to observe Hooker's
order of the morning to advance his pickets in order to guard
against a surprise. Even when informed by Capt. Farmer, of
Pleasonton's staff, that a Confederate battery was posted
directly on his flank he did not believe that any attack was
intended against his corps. The Confederate pickets,
therefore crept through the thickets unmolested and accurately
reported Howard's position. Jackson formed his forces in
three lines, Rodes in front, then Colston, then A. P. Hill,
his formation reaching some distance on either side of the
road and completely enveloping the front, flank and rear of
the 11th corps. Anderson and McLaws had orders, as soon as
the sound of Jackson's guns was heard, to make a feint of
attacking the Union left to prevent aid being sent to Howard,
and at the same time to press gradually to their left until
they connected with Jackson's right, when the whole force was
to close on the Federal center. It was 5 p. m. when Jackson
formed his lines for the final attack Howard's men had stacked
their arms and were preparing their suppers. Some were
playing cards, and all were unprepared for the assault that
was soon to arouse them from their fancied security.
Intrenchments had been thrown up but they were not manned.
Not even the shot of a solitary picket alarmed the corps.
With a yell and a volley of musketry the Confederates dashed
out of the woods upon the defenseless Federals, who fled in
confusion without firing a shot. A few made an attempt to
withstand the advance, but they were swept from their position
and joined their comrades now streaming through the woods
toward Chancellorsville. The wild rush of the fugitives
aroused Hooker to action. His staff vainly tried to rally the
panic-stricken troops, making it necessary to form a new line
immediately to prevent Jackson from sweeping everything before
him. But it was not an easy matter to find men for the
formation of this new line, for as soon as Lee heard the sound
of Jackson's attack he immediately engaged tile whole line to
prevent any aid being sent to Howard. Berry's division
happened to be in reserve at a convenient distance. He was
ordered to move at once, form across the plank road and drive
the Confederates back, or at least hold them in check until
reinforcements could be sent to him. But the check to
Jackson's impetuous onslaught came from a different and
somewhat unexpected quarter. When Pleasonton left Sickles at
the iron foundry he proceeded leisurely back to Hazel grove
with the 8th and 17th Penn. cavalry and Martin's battery of
horse artillery. Upon reaching the open space he had left a
short time before he found it filled with a confused mass of
men, guns, caissons and ambulances, all bent on getting out of
the way as soon as possible. Charging upon this disorderly
aggregation he cleared the space for action. To gain time,
for the enemy was already forming for another attack, he
ordered Maj. Keenan of the 8th Penn. to charge the Confederate
lines. This was bravely done, though Keenan and 32 of his men
never returned. Pleasonton next ordered Martin to bring his
guns into battery, load them with double charges of canister,
and aim so that the shot would strike the ground some distance
in advance of the approaching enemy, but not to fire until
orders were given. Just at this juncture Lieut. Crosby, of
the 4th U. S. artillery, reported to Pleasonton that he had a
battery of 6 guns at hand. This was placed by the side of
Martin's battery, giving Pleasonton l2 guns, and to get more a
detachment of the 17th Penn. charged on the stragglers and
took possession of 10 pieces, which were brought quickly into
line. It was now dusk. Keenan's charge, although disastrous
to himself, had gained for Pleasonton a valuable quarter of an
hour. The Confederate line emerged from the woods bearing a
Union flag which had been dropped by some of the flying
troops. They called out not to shoot as they were friends,
but a moment later discharged a volley directly at the men
behind the guns. Pleasonton then gave the order to fire. The
whole line of guns, double-shotted and aimed low, belched
forth a murderous discharge of iron hail that swept the
advancing Confederates off their feet. Before the line could
be reformed the guns were again loaded and again that shower
of death-dealing missiles was sent hurtling through the ranks
of the enemy. The cannonade continued for fully 20 minutes,
when the Confederates gave up the attempt to storm the battery
and retired to the woods.
When Berry received the order to move out and recapture
the works of the routed 11th corps he promptly obeyed, but
found a large force of the enemy in possession. He then
formed his line in the valley in front and held his position
there to await developments. Warren had stopped several of
the retreating batteries and now formed them across the plank
road in the rear of the infantry. When Pleasonton opened fire
on the enemy Warren's guns were also brought into action and
rendered effective service, while Berry steadily advanced his
line, meanwhile keeping up an incessant fire of musketry up
the road and into the woods. About 8:30 the firing began to
decrease and half an hour later ceased altogether. Jackson
ordered A. P. Hill's division to the front for the purpose of
continuing the fight, and with his staff rode forward to
examine the position. He had not proceeded far when a fire
from Berry's pickets warned him that the Federals were on the
alert. As he rode back to his lines Hill's men were just
taking position. Mistaking Jackson and his staff for Union
cavalry some of them fired. Half of his escort were killed or
wounded. He was struck by three balls, being wounded in both
hands and his left arm. He was taken to Guiney's station, to
keep him from being captured, pneumonia set in and he died on
May 10.
In the Union line of battle on Sunday morning the
position of the left and center remained the same, except
Howard's corps was moved to the extreme left, where no attack
was likely to be made. The left was held by Hancock, the
center by Slocum, and the right, facing west by Sickles and
French's division of Couch's corps. Sickles, extreme left
(Birney's division) occupied the little plateau of Hazel
grove, which commanded the Union center, and if won by the
enemy he could pour an enfilading fire into Slocum's ranks.
During the night Reynolds' corps had come up. It was placed
so as to. guard the roads to Ely's and the United States
fords, and occupied the position which had been Jackson's
objective point. After Jackson was wounded the command of the
corps fell on Stuart, who was busy all night reorganizing his
forces. At dawn he swung his right through the woods toward
Hazel grove, from which all the Union troops had been
withdrawn with the exception of Graham's brigade. Graham
mistook the movement for an attack and a sharp skirmish
ensued, which resulted in the Federals evacuating the hill and
retiring to Fairview. Stuart was quick to see the advantage
he had gained. He immediately occupied the hill with 30
pieces of artillery and opened fire on Chancellorsville. His
next move was to attack Sickles on the Fairview ridge.
Sickles obstinately defended his position for over two hours,
repulsing several assaults, and then sent for reinforcements.
Just as the request reached headquarters Hooker was knocked
senseless by a cannon ball from Hazel grove, which struck the
pillar against which he was leaning. There was no one with
authority to send Sickles the desired assistance, though Meade
and Reynolds were both disengaged and either corps would have
been sufficient to enable Sickles to hold his position, or
even to assume the offensive and secure a victory. Sickles
fought on until his ammunition was exhausted, when he withdrew
his useless artillery, fell back to a second line, only
partially fortified, and prepared to hold that by bayonet.
Just then French made a determined attack on the Confederate
left and forced it back. This was the only offensive movement
of the Union forces that day, and Stuart rushed reinforcements
to the spot, quickly repelling the assault. Had half of
Reynolds' corps, lying idle a short distance away, been
ordered up Stuart's army might have been destroyed. During
this time Slocum's line had been subjected to a heavy fire
from the artillery at Hazel grove, and Hancock was threatened.
By 10 a. m. Lee and Stuart had succeeded in effecting a
junction of their forces, and with 40,000 men began pressing
on toward Chancellorsville, opposed by probably 30,000 under
Sickles, French and Slocum. The 42,000 of Meade, Howard and
Reynolds, all within easy call, remained inactive. Again the
assault fell on Sickles, who was without ammunition. Five
times he repulsed the enemy with bayonets. Then the
overwhelming numbers of the enemy hurled against him compelled
him to give way and the army fell back to a line which had
been mapped out the evening before.
Here was a strong position. The left was protected by
the ravine of Mineral Spring run, the right by the ravines of
the Big and Little Hunting runs, leaving only a narrow front
open to attack, and this was not easy to approach by a line of
any extent. Hooker had here over 70,000 men, while Lee's
strength was barely 40,000. Notwithstanding this disparity of
numbers he was preparing to renew the fight when he received
the news that Sedgwick and Gibbon were between him and
Fredericksburg, ready to fall on his rear or overpower Early
and cut the Confederate communications. At 11 p. m. on
Saturday, the 2nd, Sedgwick received the order to join Hooker.
It was daylight before his advance reached the left and rear
of Fredericksburg. Marye's hill was carried by assault at
11 o'clock and Sedgwick was between Lee and Early with his
corps of 22,000 men. Gibbon, with his division of 5,000, had
crossed over from Falmouth as soon as the town had been taken,
and moved to the right, but was checked by the artillery fire
and held at the canal until after the storming of the heights.
Gibbon was left to hold the town and cover the bridges and
Sedgwick sent back for Brooks' division, which had been left 3
miles below the town, to come forward and take the advance.
This delayed Sedgwick's movements until 3 p. m., giving Lee
time to send four brigades to check the Federal advance. At
Salem Church this detachment met the Confederates that had
been driven from Marye's heights, and a stand was made on a
low ridge covered with timber. An attack by Brooks and Newton
drove the Confederates from this position, but reinforcements
coming up the Union forces were in turn compelled to fall
back, closely pressed by the enemy until he was checked by the
artillery. Both armies lay that night on the field.
On Monday morning, May 4, Lee's army was in an extremely
hazardous position. His entire strength was less than 50,000
men and this force was scattered. Stuart's corps, with the
greater part of Anderson's division, was in front of Hooker at
Chancellorsville; McLaws, with about 10,000, was at Salem
Church, holding Sedgwick in check, and Early, with 8,000, was
3 miles farther south. Thus divided the Confederate army
ought to have fallen an easy prey to the superior force of the
Federals. But it was saved by the good generalship of Lee and
the inactivity of Hooker. The remainder of Anderson's
division was quietly withdrawn from Stuart and sent against
Sedgwick. Early recaptured Marye's hill, forcing Gibbon to
abandon Fredericksburg and recross the river, and then moved
to join Anderson. At 11 a. m. Sedgwick found himself
encompassed on three sides by the enemy. He reported the
situation to Hooker and asked the active support of the main
army. In reply he was directed not to attack unless the main
body at Chancellorsville did so. This order placed him on the
defensive. At 4 p. m. he formed his corps-now less than
20,000 men-with Howe facing Early on the east, Newton, with
Russell's brigade of Brooks' division, facing west against
McLaws, while Brooks' other two brigades were facing Anderson
on the south. Within the three sides of this square, both
flanks of which rested on the river, was Banks' ford, his line
of retreat in case he was compelled to abandon his position.
His entire line was thin and was confronted by a superior
force. He realized that his position was precarious, but he
determined to hold it until dark as an attempt to cross the
river in the daytime would sacrifice a large part of his
command. About 6 p. m. three guns were fired in quick
succession from one of the Confederate batteries. This was
the signal for the attack and the whole line began to advance.
The assault fell the heaviest on Howe in an effort to cut off
the Federals from the ford Newton was not assailed and Brooks
easily repulsed the attack on his line. Howe's artillery did
effective work on Early's column and threw it into confusion.
Taking advantage of the situation Howe advanced his right and
captured the greater part of the 8th La. regiment, but the
movement exposed his left and he was compelled to fall back to
a position previously selected. The enemy took this for a
retreat and charged bringing his flank opposite the Vermont
brigade stationed in a little piece of woods. This brigade
opened a galling fire and Early beat a precipitate retreat.
After the attack on his lines in the morning Sedgwick sent
word to Hooker that he could hold his position. Before Hooker
received that despatch he had sent Sedgwick an order to cross
the river. After receiving it he countermanded the order, but
Sedgwick did not receive the countermand in time. Gen.
Benham, of the engineers, had thrown a bridge across at
Scott's dam, about a mile below Banks' ford, on the 3rd. While
the attack on Sedgwick was in progress he threw over another,
and this precaution enabled Sedgwick to save his corps. Soon
after dark the order was issued to fall back to the north bank
of the Rappahannock and by daylight the next morning the
entire command was encamped on the Falmouth road a mile from
the ford
On Sunday night Hooker called a council of war, at which
it was decided to recross the Rappahannock. Some difficulty
was encountered in crossing, owing to a sudden rise in the
river, but by the 6th the entire army was on the north side,
and the diastrous Chancellorsville campaign was ended. In the
several engagements the Union army lost 1,606 killed, 9,762
wounded, and 5,919 missing. The Confederate losses, as given
by brigade and division commanders, aggregated 1,649 killed,
9,106 wounded, and 1,708 captured or missing.
[Source: The Union Army, vol. 5]
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