Many more men were wounded and never returned to the company. Several were wounded, but eventually returned to Bravo Company. One man from third platoon, John Rieck, survived for two days before succombing to his wounds. The rest died that day either on the battle field or enroute to the hospital. The vast majority of the wounded (WIA) and the killed (KIA) were from third platoon. This platoon was so decimated that some non-commissioned officers (NCO's) were brought in from first and second platoons - Staff Sgt. Jiminez, and Sgt. Nelson among others. The rest of the platoon was re-staffed with brand new replacements (a.k.a. "Twinks"). The webmaster of this website was one of those twinks and has extremely strong memories of the bloody web gear laying on the ground in front of the supply hooch when he went to draw his rifle and web gear from the supply sergeant.

[Note: The battle Don and Fred describe below, called Xom Bo II by Army Historians, took place on June 17, 1967. For Bravo Company, it was devastating. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Platoons all had casualties. 1st and 3rd each lost about half of their men, most WIA. The battle of Ong Thanh, which took place in October of the same year, was more devastating for A & D companies, and made more news in the U.S., but "Billings" was the equivalent of Ong Thanh for Bravo Company. Most all of Bravo Company's KIA for the year of 1967 happened during Operation Billings, more precisely the battle of June 17th. The battle took its toll on the VC as well, as verified enemy killed was 222. Don included a hand-drawn map of the battle area (above), showing positions of VC elements, Dust-off's and Bravo Company. the battle is referred to as Xom Bo II, and was located in LZ X-Ray. Army interrogation of a VC captive indicated that four companies of the 271st VC Regiment had prepared an ambush at the LZ (LZ X-Ray). The original plan was to airmobile Bravo Company and elements of the 1/16th in to LZ X-Ray, but 1st Division Stategists changed plans and had them walk to LZ X-Ray, which was about a mile and a half away as the crow flies, but the Army never marches as the crow flies!]

Fred's memories of the first NDP:
I was a PFC relatively new. They called guys like me a twink and acted near contemptuous of our being there.

On the first leg of the operation we set up on a small hill. The ground was not good and it was difficult to dig in. Our Depue Fighting Positions were incomplete. We could only dig in about knee or thigh depth. The top half consisted of whatever materials we could scrounge-such as fallen tree limbs.

One day I was sent out on LP. I remember walking into a clearing and then about 50 yards into the jungle before finding a place to set up. There were only three of us. The older guy received a radio message that he was to report to the CP and he left me there with a guy I went to AIT with. We thought he would only be gone for a few minutes.

About an hour passed and the NDP was hit by mortars. The fire came from the direct front of my position, but the jungle was so thick that we couldn't see more than 20 or 30 feet. It got a little scary.

We didn't even know the call sign, but the CP kept trying to call us. Finally I picked up the key mike and was told to get back, ASAP!

When we stood up we were both disoriented (no one thought of giving us twinks a compass or map). Every direction looked the same and I told 6 Kilo of our plight. We were brought in via sound shots. Then we caught hell for being stupid twinks.

Shortly after getting in we were hit with mortars again. This time we took casualties. I could hear others close by yelling, "medic" over and over as the rounds splashed around the NDP. The mortar attack subsided after about 20 minutes or so.

Shortly thereafter dust-offs came in and took the wounded out. Two or three were from the Third Herd. But, being relatively new I didn't know them that well.

I think it was the next day where we saddled up and went on a forced march--several clicks. I was not accustomed to the heat and humidity and recall feeling like I had just played 16 consecutive quarters of football. Cramping developed in my calves.

Don takes up the story:
The night before the battle of June 17th, we were at a different NDP [the one Fred Hill described, LZ Rufe]. For some reason we were not as organized as usual. I think we got there late and the area wasn't that great. The next morning we were going to chopper to the next NDP. For some reason the choppers were tied up, so we walked to the new NDP.

Fred adds these comments about the march to the new NDP:
At one point the march was halted. An experienced soldier informed me that we were about to walk into some bad s..t... I recall our Kilo reading one of those little Bibles we were issued (by the way I still have mine).

Don continues:
We entered the new NDP where the arrows show on the drawing. If I judge right, the clearing for the new NDP was around 15 acres. I marked where we were when the battle started. I heard later that the VC were waiting for us to chopper in. They had two fifty caliber machineguns where I have it marked, so they would have a cross fire. I think it was between 10 and 11 a.m. when we got there.

Fred adds:
We then proceeded to a clearing and skirted its edges moving parallel. At this point there were some cautionary halts and I recall someone reporting running VC. I recall everyone's excitement level rising. More and more reports came in.

Don takes up:
There was supposed to be two regiments of VC at the one end and another one to come up behind us. The VC that was suppose to come behind us, ran into the 1/16th Infantry which was operating in that area. If it had not been for them running into the 1/16th, they would have trapped us from behind. Also I don't think all of the first two VC regiments made it there.

Fred agrees:
I recall another battalion operating on the other side of the clearing. I could see them moving in the same direction as us. Soon there was gunfire. It became intense and I recall our point element being cut off from the main body. Captain Turner came crashing through from behind us with his Kilo in tow. He knew I was a twink and he said , "Just like a picnic back home, eh!" His demeanor and words brought me a little confidence. He didn't talk or act like a man who was going to be hurt or killed therefore, I thought I wasn't going to be either.

From an article in a First Division Magazine: At 0800 hours the first march unit consisting of A and B Companies of the 1/16 Infantry and B Company 2/28 Infantry departed LZ Rufe for LZ X-Ray.

Upon their arrival at the LZ, the 1/16 units were to defend the eastern portion of the perimeter, with B Comany, 2/28, under the Command of Captain John Turner, taking the western side. At 1030 hours A Company, 1/16, arrived at LZ X-Ray, as the second march unit, A Company, 2/28, departed from Rufe. To avoid exposing themselves in the clearing, the units began to deploy around it by making their way through the jungle that surrounded the landing zone. Approaching it from the south, A Company, 1/16 led the battalion's other units around the east side of the LZ, while B Company, 2/28, moved up the west side.

On the eastern side of the perimeter, A Company, 1/16, deployed in the north; B Company, 1/16, in the center; and Recon Platoon in the south, pending arrival of C Company, 1/16. To the west, B Company, 2/28, spread itself thinly over the perimeter. Upon arriving at the landing zone, A Company, 2/28 was to take over the northwest sector of the perimeter, allowing B Company to deploy to the southwest in positions that were closer together.

Immediately on deploying, the units sent out patrols. Before the men could start digging defensive positions or set up claymore mines in front of the perimeter, the patrols had revealed the enemy's presence. Meanwhile, at 1215 hours, A Company, 2/28 commanded by Captain Donald W. Sawtelle, had entered the LZ and was moving north along the B Company positions.

At approximately 1242 hours B Company, 1/16, began receiving sniper fire, which steadily increased in intensity. It was now apparent that a heavy enemy engagement was imminent. Captain Ulm, Commanding Officer of B Company, 1/16, notified his battalion command post (CP) of the activity and the patrols that had been out rejoined their parent units.

By 1255 hours B Company, 2/28, and A Company, 1/16, were receiving heavy automatic weapons and small arms fire from the north, with the heaviest volume being directed against the northernmost platoons of each company.

Don continues:
By now our company was calling in all the back up we could. By this I mean artillery, mortar, air strikes & gunships.

From the 1st Division Magazine: Artillery and light fireteam gunships were requested and the response was immediate. Tactical air support had also been requested. At 1300 hours, the 105mm howitzers of the 2/33 Artillery began pounding the Viet Cong. Two gunships provided continuous support to the units in the north.

From Fred:
The air support was so close on our left flank that the smoke completely enveloped us as we laid on the ground. One of the E-5s was struck in the forearm by a piece of shrapnel.

From the 1st Division Article: At 1306 hours three groups of enemy simultaneously assaulted the left flank of A Company, 1/16, and the end position on the right flank of B Company, 2/28. The Viet Cong moved toward these positions, throwing hand grenades and firing rockets (RPGs) and automatic weapons. The US units used anthills and clusters of bamboo for cover.

Back to Don:
While this was going on, some of us were in the center of the clearing. I think we were trying to get over to the wood line on the other side and we got pinned down. It was in the afternoon when things started to die down. The choppers were getting the wounded out as fast as they could (in the area I have marked). I am pretty sure they were being fired at while they were doing this.

From the 1st Division article: Sixty to Seventy Viet Cong were able to penetrate a portion of the position manned by the 3rd platoon, 1/16. However, the enemy success was short-lived, as artillery fire was adjusted closer to the perimeter. This, together with a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire and support from two gunships firing into the area, stopped the assault nine minutes after it had started.

In the mean time, a group of VC attacking B Company, 2/28, had killed two men in the northern most position of that company at the start of the assault from the north. Two of the enemy occupied the position and started firing from it. Private First Class Ben Walker, a radio operator in first platoon, assumed control of his squad when the squad leader was wounded and quickly maneuvered it to the area of the heaviest contact. He then deployed the squad and began directing return fire into the VC soldiers. Continuing to expose himself to intense enemy fire, PFC Walker then moved to position from which he called for and adjusted his unit's mortar fire on the enemy, forcing them to withdraw. For his heroism, Walker was awarded the Silver Star medal.

Another member of 3rd platoon, Private First Class Dennie D. Smith, occupied a position next to the one that had been penetrated and held it throughout most of the engagement. As three Viet Cong approached him, PFC Smith moved behind a small tree and stayed there, throwing hand grenades and firing his M-16 at the enemy. He was later awarded the Bronze Star medal with "V" (for Valor) device for his actions.

Fred comments:
Somehow we were getting word of who was hit and how bad. Two or three were known KIA. One of the WIAs died after being tended to by the medic who went forward with the relief squad. We got the dead and wounded out and started digging in. We were still taking fire at various points around the perimeter. It was starting to get dark out.

Another soldier (an older guy) and I were sent on a detail in the clearing where choppers we were bringing in supplies. I remember we were getting hit with mortars again. I then heard the distinct sound of a 50 cal. machine gun firing. The funny thing was that I didn't recall any of our units being in the vicinity of where the shots were coming from. I asked the guy I was with if he thought our people had a fifty. He told me the VC were using it.

From the 1st Divsion Article: At about 1325 hours, a 60mm mortar barrage was directed against the northern elements of A Company, 1/16, and B Company, 2/28. The barrage consisted of 15 to 20 mortar rounds and ended at 1330 hours. Following this, the Viet Cong launched another assault on A Company, 1/16.

At the same time as the second attack on A Company, 1/16, other Viet Cong moved in on hte right flank of B Company, 2/28. However, artillery fire once more proved to be a deadly deterrent to any further advance by the enemy.

Don adds:
We started to dig in after things died down. By this time we were low on men. There were a lot of new men in the company, and this was their first taste of combat. Once dug in, we placed our claymores and trip flares out and started guard for what we knew would be a long night.

Fred continues:
I remember the password and reply for that night: Broad/Wife.

That night we settled in and Walker was told to go up to the CP. SFC Gilberts told him that the General was there and wanted to give him a medal. Walker came back with a Silver Star pinned to his shirt.

After dark myself and the other twink who pulled LP the day before heard someone coming towards us from the front - from out of the jungle. My partner yelled, "Halt! Who goes there?" in the best of basic training fashion. Some major from HHC had gone out in front of the perimeter on his own for reasons only known to him. My partner demanded response for the password, but the guy didn't know it. His response was," My God! Don't shoot me". I don't know how to explain it, but I knew no VC would respond in the way he did, so we let him come in. If I knew then what I know now that guy would have bought me a beer.

Don's memories of that night:
During the night we had periodic incoming motor rounds. I remember jumping in the foxhole. It was about half full of water. In the morning after a long night, we went out to patrol the area where the air strike and artillery hit. It looked like a tornado went through the jungle. A person could stand and look all around. Nothing in that area was over five feet high. I heard later the VC's were sliding bodies over the bank into the river and putting some in the bomb craters so we could not get a body count.

Fred's memories of the next day, June 18th:
The next day we were told that we were combat ineffective because of the number of casualties we sustained so we just loafed around the NDP. Got a little nap time that day.

We got hit with mortars again and that guy who I went to AIT with, was stuck on LP with and challenged the major with, got wounded real bad. I can't remember his name. He was scared and I recall medics telling him he would be okay; that he had a million dollar wound and would be going home. I never saw him again.

With this, the battle of Xom Bo II and Operation Billings came to an end. Bravo Company had nine men KIA and about 20 WIA from this battle.

Dave Berry has donated a battle map of Xom Bo II, probably originally from a military source from the looks of it. This map shows the locations of all of the units of the 2/28 and the 1/16. When used in conjunction with the hand drawn map that Don Koch supplied above, it gives a pretty good overall picture of the Battle of Xom Bo II. To see this map, click here.

If you have memories of Operation Billings, and would like to share them, please send me an email: John McCoy. Don Koch requests that you write him if you have memories that differ from his, or if you would like to add something to his comments: Donald Koch