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THROUGH THE CAROLINAS

January 9^th, 1865, the non-veterans of the regiment were mustered out with all the commissioned officers, except the officers of Companies H and I and the Adjutant, and the veterans were consolidated in two companies, H and I, and placed in command of the Adjutant as the ranking officer of the battalion.

During the latter part of January, 1865, with the 3^rd Division, 15^th A. C., we crossed the Savannah river and marched to Pocotalloga, S. C. near the head of Beaufort bay. Thence with the 15^th Corps we participated in the memorable march of Sherman through the Carolinas.

About the time this march commenced, a conference of Confederate officers was held near Augusta, Ga., for consultation in regard to proper means and measures to check Sherman’s further advance. At this meeting were present Beauregard, Hardee, G. W. Smith and D. H. Hill, and as a result of their deliberations they decided that they could concentrate about 33,00 troops of all arms, for this purpose. They appear to have been somewhat misled as to the direction of Sherman’s movement, and to have attached entirely

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too much importance to natural obstacles, such as swamps, rivers, etc., in his way. I has been said that the opinion of these officers was decidedly in favor of transferring these troops rapidly to Petersburg, and hurling them against Grant’s left flank, but they were over-ruled by the authorities at Richmond, who were unwilling to abandon so large a slice of territory without a struggle. We can only conjecture what might have been the result of such a movement but it is evident now that it was the only plan that offered even a chance of success; the other alternative, Lee’s withdrawal from Grant to join Johnston, being impracticable. The situation on the Union side was as follows: The collapse of Hood’s campaign against Nashville had relieved the states of Kentucky and Tennessee from danger of invasion, and left Thomas’ great army available for services elsewhere. Accordingly, Schofield and the 23^rd Corps were transferred to the east to take part in the movements being made to assist Sherman, while Thomas disposed the balance of his army, (which included a very large force of cavalry,) with a view to holding the country, and for rapid advance in the spring. A. J. Smith’s command of the 16^th Army Corps had been sent to assist Canby at Mobile, and a large cavalry command under General Wilson, moved down through central Alabama to attack Selma, and finish if possible, Forest and his command – both of which were successful.

The 23^rd Corps arrived in the east early in February, just after the capture of Fort Fisher by General Terry, with troops from the 10^th Corps (directly following Gen. Butler’s "powder ship expedition") and a portion of it was ordered to assist in the capture of Wilmington, which it was

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thought might possibly be needed by Gen. Sherman as a base of supplies. This was accomplished February 22^nd, and Hoke’s Division (Confederate) which had been defending the place, immediately joined Gen. Johnston. Meanwhile, other Union troops had advanced toward Kingston (on the direct road from Newberne to Goldsboro) which place they captured after a severe battle with the forces of Gen. Bragg, and ultimately reached Goldsboro, a couple of days before the arrival of Sherman’s army.

The Confederate forces gathered to oppose our advance were considerably scattered, being unwilling to give up either Charleston or Augusta, both of which were threatened by Sherman’s movement.

The Confederates fell back behind the South Edisto, taking position at Branchville. On February 7^th we struck the railroad from Augusta to Charleston at Midway, and separated Hardee, and that place, from the rest of the Confederate forces. So far, we had advanced over roads, nearly every foot of which had to be "corduroyed." If "The March to the Sea" was distinguished for its railroad destruction, certainly the march through the Carolinas was made forever memorable by the miles of road we built!

In former campaigns, the trains had been allowed to get through as best they could; here, road making was a science. It became the custom, to detail one division of each corps to march with the trains, to make road, and act as rear-guard.

As soon as the train struck a mud-hole and stopped, the troops pushed forward until they reached the obstruction, when the came into line, and stacking arms, proceeded to fill the road with fence rails (if they were not to be had,

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small trees were cut down) and over this solid, but rather rough causeway, the trains passed in safety. When the road sank in the mud, or became displaced, or worn out, it was renewed by succeeding detachments, and thus the long train rolled on, with scarcely a halt. This took place nearly every day, and I can assure you, the service was as heartily disliked, as it was promptly executed.

The North Edisto was crossed on the 12^th and the branch railroad to Columbia struck at Orangeburg. On the 16^th, a crossing was made, and pontoons laid over the Saluda, just above Columbia, which was soon occupied by a division of the 15^th Corps. It had been previously taken by a detachment of the 13^th Iowa Infantry, of Belknap’s Brigade 17^th corps, who crossed the river in a leaky boat, carrying a stand of colors, and intending to forestall the 15^th Corps in hoisting the flag over the State House! They were not successful in fully accomplishing their enterprise, as Wheeler’s Cavalry had not yet left town, and "escorted" them back to the river on the double quick!

We witnessed the burning of Columbia. Gen. Sherman did what he could to alleviate the sufferings of the unfortunate citizens, and left them a herd of cattle for subsistence. I am afraid, however, that I cannot properly appreciate the hypocritical wailings of Wade Hampton, and other Confederate writers, in view of the fact, that none of them have ever expressed the slightest disapprobation of the destruction of Chambersburg, Pa., by Confederate cavalry. Nor did they seem to think anything wrong had been done, when Beauregard directed the people of Georgia to lay waste the whole country! An even the plundering of our Bummers was eclipsed by the wanton pillaging done by Wheeler’s

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Cavalry, as can be easily proved by protests of southern citizens and other official papers, found among the Confederate records, and now on file at the war department.

When our troops entered the city, the next day, they were ordered down to assist in destroying railroad and rolling stock, among which were long trains containing Confederate notes and bonds, just fresh from the printing press, and which have since furnished the excuse to several Missourians to mention "when they were millionaires!"

On the 20^th the whole army moved forward, passing through Winsboro and turning to the right toward the Great Pedee, at Cheraw. Kilpatrick, with some infantry support, pushed on some distance further to the north, on the road to Charlotte, N. C., to create the impression that the whole army was advancing in that direction, but he soon swung around into his proper position on the left flank of the army.

We crossed the Wateree on February 23^rd and pressed on toward Cheraw. We crossed numerous creeks, as a sample of the enterprise of the Bummers, the bridge over one of them (either Lynch or Black creek) was fortified, and held by them for two days, pending our arrival.

The whole army crossed the Pedee at Cheraw, and points above, and pushed straight for Fayetteville on the Cape Fear river, arriving on March 23^rd, where Sherman’s consolidated army corps, consisting of the 14^th, 15^th, 17^th and 20^th corps, moved upon Rolla, N. C., about the 10^th of April we learned of Gen. Lee’s surrender and a few days afterward of the assassination of President Lincoln. The route was over a very swampy country, and "corduroying" our constant occupation, there was, however, but little resistance,

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excepting from cavalry. Here, we first received notice of the appointment of Johnson to the command of the Confederates, and thenceforward expected much more energetic and systematic opposition. On March 9^th, Wade Hampton, and a part of his cavalry, made a night attack on Kilpatrick, and gained some advantage by the surprise, but were finally driven off, after suffering considerable loss. It is said that Kilpatrick led his troopers to the charge, clad only in his night garments, and riding a bobtailed mule! As Gen. Hampton, who held the high rank of Lieut. General in the Confederate service, has seemed to attach much importance to this "skirmish," would it not be well to inquire, whether Kilpatrick did not violate the laws of war, by making an attack on the enemy with the flag of truce flying?

On May 13^th we pulled out for Goldsboro, expecting to make that point without opposition, as it was supposed Johnson would not attempt to hold any position this side of Raleigh. Our Left Wing (14^th and 20^th Corps) moved up the river, as if threatening that city, while the Right Wing (15^th and 17^th Corps) moved straight for Goldsboro, marching on the Wilmington road. The left Wing met with increasing resistance at Averasboro, and points beyond, which finally culminated at Bentonville, in a considerable battle, mostly between two divisions of the 14^th Corps, under Carlin and Morgan, assisted by two brigades of the 20^th Corps.

Gen. Johnson had placed his whole army, numbering some 25,000 men, in such a position that our Left Wing would be obliged to pass by the flank in front of it, for nearly three miles! There is no doubt that the Battle of Bentonville, was entirely unexpected by our Generals, and was an attempt by Johnson, who was a great student of military history,

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to imitate the tactics of Napoleon, and striking fiercely at each portion, endeavor to destroy the separated detachments before a concentration could be effected.

After the retreat of Johnson, our army marched into Goldsboro, crossing the Neuse at Cox’s bridge. It was on this occasion that the Army of Bummers finally disbanded, and disappeared from history. Extraordinary efforts had been made to stop them at this point, and all unauthorized riders were summarily dismounted upon attempting to cross the pontoons. It was noticed, however, as the infantry was passing over, that thee seemed to be nearly the usual number of mounted men charging about on the further shore. Gen. Sherman appeared to be very impatient at the slow progress of the crossing, and frequently expressed his feelings in language more forcible than polite.

At this time, it is said, a Bummer mounted on a raw-boned mule rode up, and after saluting profoundly, delivered himself as follows: "General Sherman, the chief of the Bummers sends his compliments, and has the honor to inform you that he has a d—d sight better bridge than yours, about half a mile above, which is entirely at your service," again saluting elaborately, disappeared in the crowd. I have been informed, that at the point indicated, a bridge was actually found composed of barges used in the transportation of resin, etc., which was planked over with boards from houses that had been torn down.

Gen. Sherman received his forces, as they entered the town, and had now under his command, and invincible army of 90,000 men. He remained here refitting, and drawing supplies of various kinds until April 10^th, when the march was taken up for Raleigh, and the next day at Smithfield we

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learned much to our joy, that Lee had surrendered, and the war was practically over!

Of the unfortunate "armistice," I need say but little, but we all remember the deep feeling of indignation Halleck’s orders excited in Sherman’s army. It only goes to exemplify to what an extent a "panic" can influence men, ordinarily calm, and with well balanced minds. At this time, it is almost incomprehensible to us that Secretary Stanton, the man of iron will, and usually correct judgment would have even suspected, much less charged Gen. Sherman with treasonable intent in negotiating this treaty! But so it was ! and we have also been told, that had it not been for unfounded fears of the temper of Sherman’s army, even more extreme measures would have been pursued.

As all these orders were issued through Gen. Halleck, he got the full benefit of the deep indignation provoked by them, and when our army passed through Richmond, they refused to even salute him, and marched by his headquarters (where he stood on the portico,) at a right shoulder shift! After Johnson’s final surrender, our army returned to Raleigh and prepared for the march to Washington. From thence to our destination was uncertain. Some said we would go to Mexico to expel the French, while others thought we were bound for Red River to compel the surrender of Kirby Smith’s command.

It is true, that the campaign from Atlanta to Raleigh, had offered but few opportunities for distinction in battle, and yet, it was the most remarkable in its results, of any within my knowledge. By it the grand strategy outlined by Grant in 1864 had been brought to a successful termination.

The mighty Army of the Potomac had done well its

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part, and through battle and siege, though at times seemingly making little progress, had tenaciously clung to all it had gained and had finally held Lee and his army fast in their works at Petersburg. When Sherman’s army occupied Columbia, the death knell of the Confederacy sounded, and the inevitable result was visible to all, though the ruling powers at Richmond could not even then admit the idea of the necessity of surrender. The courage of northern manhood had been fully tested, and with few exceptions, our southern opponents had ceased to proclaim that "one southern soldier could whip four Yankees" (admitting which their cause was practically lost.) I have always felt entirely satisfied, that our Western Army was not in time to be "in at the death" at Appomatox: for while it is probably true, that Lee’s surrender would have been much longer deferred, had Sherman’s army not demoralized the transportation lines, and held the garrisons of southern cities away from his army, yet it did seem proper and appropriate, that the Army of the Potomac, which had so long and bravely wrestled with Gen. Lee, and the Army of Northern Virginia should be the one to receive its final surrender. Its losses had been fearful, principally because it had been slow to appreciate and assimilate the peculiar flanking methods of the Confederates, and perhaps partly owing to the large preponderance of regular officers, who had been educated in school of European military tactics, and who had much to unlearn before they made a success of the war. In our western army we learned these lessons sooner, and we also learned the folly of assaulting earthworks held by equal numbers. In the nature of things such assaults could seldom be successful, and were generally costly mistakes, whose sole visible outcome, were

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the tears and distress of widows and orphans, whose protectors had been thus uselessly slaughtered. The great regimental losses that you read of so often, were generally the result of such efforts, or of want of co-operation, or of faulty position, exposing the troops to attacks they were helpless to return or even resist.

The war now ended, with our corps we now started on our triumphant march to Washington; passing through Petersburg, Richmond, Fredricksburg, etc. We reached the west bank of the Potomac opposite the city on the afternoon of May 24^th. Crossed the Long Bridge on the morning of the 25^th and participated in the grand review on Pennsylvania Avenue, where two hundred thousand soldiers marched in apparently endless stream past the presidential mansion. We afterwards camped about four miles north of Washington. Remaining here about ten days with the Corps, we were sent by B. & O. R. R. and river to Louisville, Ky. The Battalion had been assigned to the 2^nd Division at Washington, and with the 2^nd Division, after a few days rest at Louisville, we were sent to Little Rock, Ark., and subsequently, ordered to St. Louis, Mo., and mustered out about the 1^st of September, 1865.

The moral heroism of the army was invincible, and I may say with all our hardships and privations, ours was the most cheerful and elastic military movement I every witnessed. Our hardships and toil far exceeded the "March to the Sea," as it did in heroism, for while we knew we were in the heart of the enemy’s country, we also felt in our souls that the end was near.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieut.-Col. T. M. Rice was born in Trumbull County, Ohio, on September 21^st, 1829. He received a common school education and studied four years at the Geauga Seminary, Chester Cross Roads. He subsequently taught school, read law, and was admitted to the bar, May, 1853.

Lieut.-Col. Rice removed to Canfield, Mahoming County, Ohio, where he practiced law until the Spring of 1858, when he removed to Missouri, locating in California, Moniteau county. In 1861, he commanded a company of Home Guards, and in October of the same year, recruited Company G, 26^th Missouri Volunteer Infantry and was mustered out in September 1865 as Lieutenant-Colonel.

After the war, Lieut.-Col. Rice, returned to the practice of his profession; was elected Circuit Judge of the First Circuit in 1868, and as Member of Congress from the Seventh District of Missouri in 1880. He has resided in Boonville, Mo., since 1870.